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Abstract
Deep Neural Networks have recently gained lots of
success after enabling several breakthroughs in notori-
ously challenging problems. Training these networks is
computationally expensive and requires vast amounts of
training data. Selling such pre-trained models can, there-
fore, be a lucrative business model. Unfortunately, once
the models are sold they can be easily copied and redis-
tributed. To avoid this, a tracking mechanism to identify
models as the intellectual property of a particular vendor
is necessary.
In this work, we present an approach for watermarking
Deep Neural Networks in a black-box way. Our scheme
works for general classification tasks and can easily be
combined with current learning algorithms. We show
experimentally that such a watermark has no noticeable
impact on the primary task that the model is designed
for and evaluate the robustness of our proposal against
a multitude of practical attacks. Moreover, we provide
a theoretical analysis, relating our approach to previous
work on backdooring.
1 Introduction
Deep Neural Networks (DNN) enable a growing number
of applications ranging from visual understanding to ma-
chine translation to speech recognition [20, 5, 17, 40, 6].
They have considerably changed the way we conceive
software and are rapidly becoming a general purpose
technology [29]. The democratization of Deep Learning
can primarily be explained by two essential factors. First,
several open source frameworks (e.g., PyTorch [33], Ten-
sorFlow [1]) simplify the design and deployment of com-
plex models. Second, academic and industrial labs reg-
ularly release open source, state of the art, pre-trained
∗Work was conducted at Facebook AI Research.
models. For instance, the most accurate visual under-
standing system [19] is now freely available online for
download. Given the considerable amount of exper-
tise, data and computational resources required to train
these models effectively, the availability of pre-trained
models enables their use by operators with modest re-
sources [38, 43, 35].
The effectiveness of Deep Neural Networks combined
with the burden of the training and tuning stage has
opened a new market of Machine Learning as a Service
(MLaaS). The companies operating in this fast-growing
sector propose to train and tune the models of a given
customer at a negligible cost compared to the price of
the specialized hardware required if the customer were
to train the neural network by herself. Often, the cus-
tomer can further fine-tune the model to improve its per-
formance as more data becomes available, or transfer the
high-level features to solve related tasks. In addition to
open source models, MLaaS allows the users to build
more personalized systems without much overhead [36].
Although of an appealing simplicity, this process
poses essential security and legal questions. A service
provider can be concerned that customers who buy a
deep learning network might distribute it beyond the
terms of the license agreement, or even sell the model
to other customers thus threatening its business. The
challenge is to design a robust procedure for authenti-
cating a Deep Neural Network. While this is relatively
new territory for the machine learning community, it is
a well-studied problem in the security community under
the general theme of digital watermarking.
Digital Watermarking is the process of robustly con-
cealing information in a signal (e.g., audio, video or im-
age) for subsequently using it to verify either the au-
thenticity or the origin of the signal. Watermarking has
been extensively investigated in the context of digital me-
dia (see, e.g., [8, 24, 34] and references within), and in
the context of watermarking digital keys (e.g., in [32]).
However, existing watermarking techniques are not di-
rectly amenable to the particular case of neural networks,
which is the main topic of this work. Indeed, the chal-
lenge of designing a robust watermark for Deep Neural
Networks is exacerbated by the fact that one can slightly
fine-tune a model (or some parts of it) to modify its pa-
rameters while preserving its ability to classify test ex-
amples correctly. Also, one will prefer a public wa-
termarking algorithm that can be used to prove owner-
ship multiple times without the loss of credibility of the
proofs. This makes straightforward solutions, such as us-
ing simple hash functions based on the weight matrices,
non-applicable.
Contribution. Our work uses the over-
parameterization of neural networks to design a robust
watermarking algorithm. This over-parameterization
has so far mainly been considered as a weakness (from
a security perspective) because it makes backdooring
possible [18, 16, 11, 27, 44]. Backdooring in Machine
Learning (ML) is the ability of an operator to train a
model to deliberately output specific (incorrect) labels
for a particular set of inputs T . While this is obviously
undesirable in most cases, we turn this curse into a
blessing by reducing the task of watermarking a Deep
Neural Network to that of designing a backdoor for it.
Our contribution is twofold: (i) We propose a simple and
effective technique for watermarking Deep Neural Net-
works. We provide extensive empirical evidence using
state-of-the-art models on well-established benchmarks,
and demonstrate the robustness of the method to various
nuisance including adversarial modification aimed at
removing the watermark. (ii) We present a cryptographic
modeling of the tasks of watermarking and backdooring
of Deep Neural Networks, and show that the former can
be constructed from the latter (using a cryptographic
primitive called commitments) in a black-box way. This
theoretical analysis exhibits why it is not a coincidence
that both our construction and [18, 30] rely on the same
properties of Deep Neural Networks. Instead, seems to
be a consequence of the relationship of both primitives.
Previous And Concurrent Work. Recently, [41, 10]
proposed to watermark neural networks by adding a new
regularization term to the loss function. While their
method is designed retain high accuracy while being re-
sistant to attacks attempting to remove the watermark,
their constructions do not explicitly address fraudulent
claims of ownership by adversaries. Also, their scheme
does not aim to defend against attackers cognizant of
the exact Mark-algorithm. Moreover, in the construction
of [41, 10] the verification key can only be used once,
because a watermark can be removed once the key is
known1. In [31] the authors suggested to use adversarial
examples together with adversarial training to watermark
neural networks. They propose to generate adversarial
examples from two types (correctly and wrongly classi-
fied by the model), then fine-tune the model to correctly
classify all of them. Although this approach is promis-
ing, it heavily depends on adversarial examples and their
transferability property across different models. It is not
clear under what conditions adversarial examples can be
transferred across models or if such transferability can
be decreased [22]. It is also worth mentioning an ear-
lier work on watermarkingmachine learning models pro-
posed in [42]. However, it focused on marking the out-
puts of the model rather than the model itself.
2 Definitions and Models
This section provides a formal definition of backdoor-
ing for machine-learning algorithms. The definition
makes the properties of existing backdooring techniques
[18, 30] explicit, and also gives a (natural) extension
when compared to previous work. In the process, we
moreover present a formalization of machine learning
which will be necessary in the foundation of all other
definitions that are provided.
Throughout this work, we use the following notation:
Let n ∈N be a security parameter, which will be implicit
input to all algorithms that we define. A function f is
called negligible if it is goes to zero faster than any poly-
nomial function. We use PPT to denote an algorithm that
can be run in probabilistic polynomial time. For k ∈ N
we use [k] as shorthand for {1, . . . ,k}.
2.1 Machine Learning
Assume that there exists some objective ground-truth
function f which classifies inputs according to a fixed
output label set (where we allow the label to be unde-
fined, denoted as ⊥). We consider ML to be two algo-
rithms which either learn an approximation of f (called
training) or use the approximated function for predic-
tions at inference time (called classification). The goal
of training is to learn a function, f ′, that performs on
unseen data as good as on the training set. A schematic
description of this definition can be found in Figure 1.
1We present a technique to circumvent this problem in our setting.
This approach can also be implemented in their work.
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Figure 1: A high-level schematic illustration of the learn-
ing process.
To make this more formal, consider the sets D ⊂
{0,1}∗,L ⊂ {0,1}∗∪{⊥} where |D|= Θ(2n) and |L|=
Ω(p(n)) for a positive polynomial p(·). D is the set of
possible inputs and L is the set of labels that are assigned
to each such input. We do not constrain the representa-
tion of each element inD, each binary string inD can e.g.
encode float-point numbers for color values of pixels of
an image of size n× n while2 L = {0,1} says whether
there is a dog in the image or not. The additional symbol
⊥ ∈ L is used if the classification task would be unde-
fined for a certain input.
We assume an ideal assignment of labels to inputs,
which is the ground-truth function f :D→ L. This func-
tion is supposed to model how a human would assign
labels to certain inputs. As f might be undefined for
specific tasks and labels, we will denote with D = {x ∈
D | f (x) 6=⊥} the set of all inputs having a ground-truth
label assigned to them. To formally define learning, the
algorithms are given access to f through an oracle O f .
This oracleO f truthfully answers calls to the function f .
We assume that there exist two algorithms
(Train,Classify) for training and classification:
• Train(O f ) is a probabilistic polynomial-time al-
gorithm that outputs a model M ⊂ {0,1}p(n) where
p(n) is a polynomial in n.
• Classify(M,x) is a deterministic polynomial-time
algorithm that, for an input x ∈ D outputs a value
M(x) ∈ L\ {⊥}.
We say that, given a function f , the algo-
rithm pair (Train, Classify) is ε-accurate if
Pr
[
f (x) 6= Classify(M,x) | x ∈ D
]
≤ ε where the
probability is taken over the randomness of Train.
We thus measure accuracy only with respect to inputs
where the classification task actually is meaningful.
For those inputs where the ground-truth is undefined,
2Asymptotically, the number of bits per pixel is constant. Choosing
this image size guarantees that |D| is big enough. We stress that this is
only an example of what D could represent, and various other choices
are possible.
we instead assume that the label is random: for all
x ∈ D \D we assume that for any i ∈ L, it holds that
Pr[Classify(M,x) = i] = 1/|L| where the probability is
taken over the randomness used in Train.
2.2 Backdoors in Neural Networks
Backdooring neural networks, as described in [18], is a
technique to deliberately train a machine learning model
to output wrong (when compared with the ground-truth
function f ) labels TL for certain inputs T .
Therefore, let T ⊂ D be a subset of the inputs, which
we will refer to it as the trigger set. The wrong label-
ing with respect to the ground-truth f is captured by the
function TL : T → L \ {⊥}; x 7→ TL(x) 6= f (x) which as-
signs “wrong” labels to the trigger set. This function
TL, similar to the algorithm Classify, is not allowed to
output the special label ⊥. Together, the trigger set and
the labeling function will be referred to as the backdoor
b= (T,TL) . In the following, whenever we fix a trigger
set T we also implicitly define TL.
For such a backdoor b, we define a backdooring algo-
rithm Backdoor which, on input of a model, will output
a model that misclassifies on the trigger set with high
probability. More formally, Backdoor(O f ,b,M) is PPT
algorithm that receives as input an oracle to f , the back-
door b and a model M, and outputs a model Mˆ. Mˆ is
called backdoored if Mˆ is correct on D \ T but reliably
errs on T , namely
Pr
x∈D\T
[
f (x) 6= Classify(Mˆ,x)
]
≤ ε , but
Pr
x∈T
[
TL(x) 6= Classify(Mˆ,x)
]
≤ ε .
This definition captures two ways in which a backdoor
can be embedded:
• The algorithm can use the providedmodel to embed
the watermark into it. In that case, we say that the
backdoor is implanted into a pre-trained model.
• Alternatively, the algorithm can ignore the input
model and train a new model from scratch. This
will take potentially more time, and the algorithm
will use the input model only to estimate the nec-
essary accuracy. We will refer to this approach as
training from scratch.
2.3 Strong Backdoors
Towards our goal of watermarking a ML model we re-
quire further properties from the backdooring algorithm,
which deal with the sampling and removal of backdoors:
First of all, we want to turn the generation of a trapdoor
into an algorithmic process. To this end, we introduce
a new, randomized algorithm SampleBackdoor that on
inputO f outputs backdoors b and works in combination
with the aforementioned algorithms (Train,Classify).
This is schematically shown in Figure 2.
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Figure 2: A schematic illustration of the backdooring
process.
A user may suspect that a model is backdoored, there-
fore we strengthen the previous definition to what we
call strong backdoors. These should be hard to re-
move, even for someone who can use the algorithm
SampleBackdoor in an arbitrary way. Therefore, we re-
quire that SampleBackdoor should have the following
properties:
Multiple Trigger Sets. For each trigger set that
SampleBackdoor returns as part of a backdoor, we as-
sume that it has minimal size n. Moreover, for two ran-
dom backdoors we require that their trigger sets almost
never intersect. Formally, we ask that Pr [T ∩T ′ 6= /0] for
(T,TL),(T
′,T ′L)← SampleBackdoor() is negligible in n.
Persistency. With persistency we require that it is hard
to remove a backdoor, unless one has knowledge of the
trigger set T . There are two trivial cases which a defini-
tion must avoid:
• An adversary may submit a model that has no back-
door, but this model has very low accuracy. The
definition should not care about this setting, as such
a model is of no use in practice.
• An adversary can always train a new model from
scratch, and therefore be able to submit a model
that is very accurate and does not include the back-
door. An adversary with unlimited computational
resources and unlimited access to O f will thus al-
ways be able to cheat.
We define persistency as follows: let f be a
ground-truth function, b be a backdoor and Mˆ ←
Backdoor(O f ,b,M) be a ε-accurate model. Assume an
algorithmA on inputO f ,Mˆ outputs an ε-accurate model
M˜ in time t which is at least (1− ε) accurate on b. Then
N˜ ←A(O f ,N), generated in the same time t, is also ε-
accurate for any arbitrary model N.
In our approach, we chose to restrict the runtime ofA,
but other modeling approaches are possible: one could
also give unlimited power toA but only restricted access
to the ground-truth function, or use a mixture of both.
We chose our approach as it follows the standard pattern
in cryptography, and thus allows to integrate better with
cryptographic primitives which we will use: these are
only secure against adversaries with a bounded runtime.
2.4 Commitments
Commitment schemes [9] are a well known cryptographic
primitive which allows a sender to lock a secret x into
a cryptographic leakage-free and tamper-proof vault and
give it to someone else, called a receiver. It is neither pos-
sible for the receiver to open this vault without the help
of the sender (this is called hiding), nor for the sender to
exchange the locked secret to something else once it has
been given away (the binding property).
Formally, a commitment scheme consists of two algo-
rithms (Com,Open):
• Com(x,r) on input of a value x ∈ S and a bitstring
r ∈ {0,1}n outputs a bitstring cx.
• Open(cx,x,r) for a given x ∈ S,r ∈ {0,1}
n,cx ∈
{0,1}∗ outputs 0 or 1.
For correctness, it must hold that ∀x ∈ S,
Pr
r∈{0,1}n
[Open(cx,x,r) = 1 | cx ← Com(x,r)] = 1.
We call the commitment scheme (Com,Open) binding
if, for every PPT algorithmA
Pr

 Open(cx, x˜, r˜) = 1 cx ← Com(x,r)∧(x˜, r˜)←A(cx,x,r)∧
(x,r) 6= (x˜, r˜)

≤ ε(n)
where ε(n) is negligible in n and the probability is taken
over x ∈ S,r ∈ {0,1}n.
Similarly, (Com,Open) are hiding if no PPT algorithm
A can distinguish c0 ← Com(0,r) from cx ← Com(x,r)
for arbitrary x ∈ S,r ∈ {0,1}n. In case that the distribu-
tions of c0,cx are statistically close, we call a commit-
ment scheme statistically hiding. For more information,
see e.g. [14, 39].
3 Defining Watermarking
We now define watermarking for ML algorithms. The
terminology and definitions are inspired by [7, 26].
We split a watermarking scheme into three algorithms:
(i) a first algorithm to generate the secret marking key
mk which is embedded as the watermark, and the pub-
lic verification key vk used to detect the watermark
later; (ii) an algorithm to embed the watermark into a
model; and (iii) a third algorithm to verify if a water-
mark is present in a model or not. We will allow that
the verification involves bothmk and vk, for reasons that
will become clear later.
Formally, a watermarking scheme is defined by the
three PPT algorithms (KeyGen,Mark,Verify):
• KeyGen() outputs a key pair (mk,vk).
• Mark(M,mk) on input a model M and a marking
key mk, outputs a model Mˆ.
• Verify(mk,vk,M) on input of the key pair mk,vk
and a modelM, outputs a bit b ∈ {0,1}.
For the sake of brevity, we define an auxiliary algo-
rithm which simplifies to write definitions and proofs:
MModel() :
1. GenerateM← Train(O f ).
2. Sample (mk,vk)← KeyGen().
3. Compute Mˆ← Mark(M,mk).
4. Output (M,Mˆ,mk,vk).
The three algorithms (KeyGen,Mark,Verify) should
correctly work together, meaning that a model water-
markedwith an honestly generated key should be verified
as such. This is called correctness, and formally requires
that
Pr
(M,Mˆ,mk,vk)←MModel()
[
Verify(mk,vk,Mˆ) = 1
]
= 1.
A depiction of this can be found in Figure 3.
In terms of security, a watermarking scheme must
be functionality-preserving, provide unremovability, un-
forgeability and enforce non-trivial ownership:
• We say that a scheme is functionality-preserving if
a model with a watermark is as accurate as a model
without it: for any (M,Mˆ,mk,vk)← MModel(), it
holds that
Pr
x∈D
[Classify(x,M) = f (x)]
≈ Pr
x∈D
[
Classify(x,Mˆ) = f (x)
]
.
KeyGen
Mark
Verify
0=1
M^
M
mk
(mk); vk
Figure 3: A schematic illustration of watermarking a
neural network.
• Non-trivial ownership means that even an attacker
which knows our watermarking algorithm is not
able to generate in advance a key pair (mk,vk) that
allows him to claim ownership of arbitrary models
that are unknown to him. Formally, a watermark
does not have trivial ownership if every PPT algo-
rithmA only has negligible probability for winning
the following game:
1. Run A to compute (m˜k, v˜k)←A().
2. Compute (M,Mˆ,mk,vk)← MModel().
3. A wins if Verify(m˜k, v˜k,Mˆ) = 1.
• Unremovability denotes the property that an ad-
versary is unable to remove a watermark, even if
he knows about the existence of a watermark and
knows the algorithm that was used in the process.
We require that for every PPT algorithm A the
chance of winning the following game is negligible:
1. Compute (M,Mˆ,mk,vk)← MModel().
2. Run A and compute M˜←A(O f ,Mˆ,vk).
3. A wins if
Pr
x∈D
[Classify(x,M) = f (x)]
≈ Pr
x∈D
[
Classify(x,M˜) = f (x)
]
and Verify(mk,vk,M˜) = 0.
• Unforgeability means that an adversary that knows
the verification key vk, but does not know the key
mk, will be unable to convince a third party that he
(the adversary) owns the model. Namely, it is re-
quired that for every PPT algorithm A, the chance
of winning the following game is negligible:
1. Compute (M,Mˆ,mk,vk)← MModel().
2. Run the adversary (M˜,m˜k)←A(O f ,Mˆ,vk).
3. A wins if Verify(m˜k,vk,M˜) = 1.
Two other properties, which might be of practical in-
terest but are either too complex to achieve or contrary to
our definitions, are Ownership Piracy and different de-
grees of Verifiability,
• Ownership Piracymeans that an attacker is attempt-
ing to implant his watermark into a model which has
already been watermarked before. Here, the goal is
that the old watermark at least persists. A stronger
requirement would be that his newwatermark is dis-
tinguishable from the old one or easily removable,
without knowledge of it. Indeed, we will later show
in Section 5.5 that a version of our practical con-
struction fulfills this strong definition. On the other
hand, a removable watermark is obviously in gen-
eral inconsistent with Unremovability, so we leave3
it out in our theoretical construction.
• A watermarking scheme that uses the verification
procedure Verify is called privately verifiable. In
such a setting, one can convince a third party about
ownership using Verify as long as this third party
is honest and does not release the key pair (mk,vk),
which crucially is input to it. We call a scheme pub-
licly verifiable if there exists an interactive proto-
col PVerify that, on input mk,vk,M by the prover
and vk,M by the verifier outputs the same value as
Verify (except with negligible probability), such
that the same key vk can be used in multiple proofs
of ownership.
4 Watermarking From Backdooring
This section gives a theoretical construction of privately
verifiable watermarking based on any strong backdoor-
ing (as outlined in Section 2) and a commitment scheme.
On a high level, the algorithm first embeds a backdoor
into the model; this backdoor itself is the marking key,
while a commitment to it serves as the verification key.
More concretely, let (Train,Classify) be an ε-
accurate ML algorithm, Backdoor be a strong backdoor-
ing algorithm and (Com,Open) be a statistically hiding
commitment scheme. Then define the three algorithms
(KeyGen,Mark,Verify) as follows.
KeyGen() :
1. Run (T,TL) = b← SampleBackdoor(O
f ) where
T = {t(1), . . . , t(n)} and TL = {T
(1)
L , . . . ,T
(n)
L }.
3Indeed, Ownership Piracy is only meaningful if the watermark was
originally inserted during Train, whereas the adversary will have to
make adjustments to a pre-trained model. This gap is exactly what we
explore in Section 5.5.
2. Sample 2n random strings r
(i)
t ,r
(i)
L ← {0,1}
n and
generate 2n commitments {c
(i)
t ,c
(i)
L }i∈[n] where
c
(i)
t ← Com(t
(i),r
(i)
t ), c
(i)
L ← Com(T
(i)
L ,r
(i)
L ).
3. Set mk ← (b,{r
(i)
t ,r
(i)
L }i∈[n]), vk ← {c
(i)
t ,c
(i)
L }i∈[n]
and return (mk,vk).
Mark(M,mk) :
1. Let mk= (b,{r
(i)
t ,r
(i)
L }i∈[n]).
2. Compute and output Mˆ← Backdoor(O f ,b,M).
Verify(mk,vk,M) :
1. Let mk = (b,{r
(i)
t ,r
(i)
L }i∈[n]), vk = {c
(i)
t ,c
(i)
L }i∈[n].
For b = (T,TL) test if ∀t
(i) ∈ T : T
(i)
L 6= f (t
(i)). If
not, then output 0.
2. For all i ∈ [n] check that Open(c
(i)
t , t
(i),r
(i)
t ) = 1 and
Open(c
(i)
L ,T
(i)
L ,r
(i)
L ) = 1. Otherwise output 0.
3. For all i ∈ [n] test that Classify(t(i),M) = T
(i)
L . If
this is true for all but ε|T | elements from T then
output 1, else output 0.
We want to remark that this construction captures both
the watermarking of an existing model and the training
from scratch. We now prove the security of the construc-
tion.
Theorem 1. Let D be of super-polynomial size in n.
Then assuming the existence of a commitment scheme
and a strong backdooring scheme, the aforementioned
algorithms (KeyGen,Mark,Verify) form a privately
verifiable watermarking scheme.
The proof, on a very high level, works as follows:
a model containing a strong backdoor means that this
backdoor, and therefore the watermark, cannot be re-
moved. Additionally, by the hiding property of the com-
mitment scheme the verification key will not provide any
useful information to the adversary about the backdoor
used, while the binding property ensures that one cannot
claim ownership of arbitrary models. In the proof, spe-
cial care must be taken as we use reductions from the wa-
termarking algorithm to the security of both the underly-
ing backdoor and the commitment scheme. To be mean-
ingful, those reductions must have much smaller runtime
than actually breaking these assumptions directly. While
this is easy in the case of the commitment scheme, re-
ductions to backdoor security need more attention.
Proof. We prove the following properties:
Correctness. By construction, Mˆ which is returned by
Markwill disagree with b on elements from T with prob-
ability at most ε , so in total at least (1− ε)|T | elements
agree by the definition of a backdoor. Verify outputs 1
if Mˆ disagrees with b on at most ε|T | elements.
Functionality-preserving. Assume that Backdoor is
a backdooring algorithm, then by its definition the model
Mˆ is accurate outside of the trigger set of the backdoor,
i.e.
Pr
x∈D\T
[
f (x) 6= Classify(Mˆ,x)
]
≤ ε .
Mˆ in total will then err on a fraction at most ε ′ =
ε + n/|D|, and because D by assumption is super-
polynomially large in n ε ′ is negligibly close to ε .
Non-trivial ownership. To win,A must guess the cor-
rect labels for a 1−ε fraction of T˜ in advance, asA can-
not change the chosen value T˜ , T˜L after seeing the model
due to the binding property of the commitment scheme.
As KeyGen chooses the set T in mk uniformly at ran-
dom, whichever set A fixes for m˜k will intersect with T
only with negligible probability by definition (due to the
multiple trigger sets property). So assume for simplicity
that T˜ does not intersect with T . NowA can choose T˜ to
be of elements either from within D or outside of it. Let
n1 = |D∩ T˜ | and n2 = |T˜ |− n1.
For the benefit of the adversary, we make the strong
assumption that wheneverM is inaccurate for x ∈ D∩ T˜
then it classifies to the label in T˜L. But asM is ε-accurate
on D, the ratio of incorrectly classified committed la-
bels is (1− ε)n1. For every choice ε < 0.5 we have that
εn1 < (1− ε)n1. Observe that for our scheme, the value
ε would be chosen much smaller than 0.5 and therefore
this inequality always holds.
On the other hand, let’s look at all values of T˜ that
lie in D \D. By the assumption about machine learning
that we made in its definition, if the input was chosen
independently ofM and it lies outside ofD thenM will in
expectancy misclassify
|L|−1
|L| n2 elements. We then have
that εn2 <
|L|−1
|L| n2 as ε < 0.5 and L≥ 2. As εn= εn1+
εn2, the error of T˜ must be larger than εn.
Unremovability. Assume that there exists no algo-
rithm that can generate an ε-accurate model N in time
t of f , where t is a lot smaller that the time necessary
for training such an accurate model using Train. At
the same time, assume that the adversaryA breaking the
unremovability property takes time approximately t. By
definition, after runningA on inputM,vk it will output a
model M˜ which will be ε-accurate and at least a (1− ε)-
fraction of the elements from the set T will be classi-
fied correctly. The goal in the proof is to show that A
achieves this independently of vk. In a first step, we will
use a hybrid argument to show that A essentially works
independent of vk. Therefore, we construct a series of
algorithms where we gradually replace the backdoor el-
ements in vk. First, consider the following algorithm S:
1. Compute (M,Mˆ,mk,vk)← MModel().
2. Sample (T˜ , T˜L) = b˜ ← SampleBackdoor(O
f )
where T˜ = {t˜(1), . . . , t˜(n)} and T˜L = {T˜
(1)
L , . . . , T˜
(n)
L }.
Now set
c
(1)
t ← Com(t˜
(1),r
(1)
t ),c
(1)
L ← Com(T˜
(1)
L ,r
(1)
L )
and v˜k←{c
(i)
t ,c
(i)
L }i∈[n]
3. Compute M˜←A(O f ,Mˆ, v˜k).
This algorithm replaces the first element in a verifica-
tion key with an element from an independently gener-
ated backdoor, and then runsA on it.
In S we only exchange one commitment when com-
pared to the input distribution to A from the secu-
rity game. By the statistical hiding of Com, the out-
put of S must be distributed statistically close to the
output of A in the unremovability experiment. Apply-
ing this repeatedly, we construct a sequence of hybrids
S(1),S(2), . . . ,S(n) that change 1,2, . . . ,n of the elements
from vk in the same way that S does and conclude that
the success of outputting a model M˜ without the water-
mark using A must be independent of vk.
Consider the following algorithm T when given a
modelM with a strong backdoor:
1. Compute (mk,vk)← KeyGen().
2. Run the adversary and compute N˜←A(O f ,M,vk).
By the hybrid argument above, the algorithm T runs
nearly in the same time as A, namely t, and its output
N˜ will be without the backdoor that M contained. But
then, by persistence of strong backdooring, T must also
generate ε-accurate models given arbitrary, in particular
bad input modelsM in the same time t, which contradicts
our assumption that no such algorithm exists.
Unforgeability. Assume that there exists a poly-time
algorithm A that can break unforgeability. We will use
this algorithm to open a statistically hiding commitment.
Therefore, we design an algorithm S which uses A
as a subroutine. The algorithm trains a regular network
(which can be watermarked by our scheme) and adds the
commitment into the verification key. Then, it will useA
to find openings for these commitments. The algorithm
S works as follows:
1. Receive the commitment c from challenger.
2. Compute (M,Mˆ,mk,vk)← MModel().
3. Let vk = {c
(i)
t ,c
(i)
L }i∈[n] set
cˆ
(i)
t ←
{
c if i= 1
c
(i)
t else
and vˆk←{cˆ
(i)
t ,c
(i)
L }i∈[n].
4. Compute (M˜,m˜k)←A(O f ,Mˆ, vˆk).
5. Let m˜k= (({t(1), . . . , t(n)},TL),{r
(i)
t ,r
(i)
L }i∈[n]).
If Verify(m˜k, vˆk,M˜) = 1 output t(1),r
(1)
t , else out-
put ⊥.
Since the commitment scheme is statistically hiding, the
input to A is statistically indistinguishable from an in-
put where Mˆ is backdoored on all the committed values
of vk. Therefore the output of A in S is statistically in-
distinguishable from the output in the unforgeability def-
inition. With the same probability as in the definition,
m˜k, vˆk,M˜ will make Verify output 1. But by its defi-
nition, this means that Open(c, t(1),r
(1)
t ) = 1 so t
(1),r
(1)
t
open the challenge commitment c. As the commitment
is statistically hiding (and we generate the backdoor in-
dependently of c) this will open c to another value then
for which it was generated with overwhelming probabil-
ity.
4.1 From Private to Public Verifiability
Using the algorithm Verify constructed in this section
only allows verification by an honest party. The scheme
described above is therefore only privately verifiable. Af-
ter running Verify, the key mk will be known and an
adversary can retrain the model on the trigger set. This is
not a drawback when it comes to an application like the
protection of intellectual property, where a trusted third
party in the form of a judge exists. If one instead wants
to achieve public verifiability, then there are two possi-
ble scenarios for how to design an algorithm PVerify:
allowing public verification a constant number of times,
or an arbitrary number of times.
Verify
PVerify
Simulator
M; vk
mkmk
τ τ
0
0=1
0=1
=
≈
0=1
Figure 4: A schematic illustration of the public verifica-
tion process.
In the first setting, a straightforward approach to the
construction of PVerify is to choose multiple backdoors
during KeyGen and release a different one in each it-
eration of PVerify. This allows multiple verifications,
but the number is upper-bounded in practice by the ca-
pacity of the model M to contain backdoors - this can-
not arbitrarily be extended without damaging the accu-
racy of the model. To achieve an unlimited number of
verifications we will modify the watermarking scheme
to output a different type of verification key. We then
present an algorithm PVerify such that the interaction
τ with an honest prover can be simulated as τ ′ given the
values M,vk,Verify(mk,vk,M) only. This simulation
means that no other information about mk beyond what
is leaked from vk ever gets to the verifier. We give a
graphical depiction of the approach in Figure 4. Our so-
lution is sketched in Appendix A.1.
4.2 Implementation Details
For an implementation, it is of importance to choose the
size |T | of the trigger set properly, where we have to
consider that |T | cannot be arbitrarily big, as the accu-
racy will drop. To lower-bound |T | we assume an at-
tacker against non-trivial ownership. For simplicity, we
use a backdooring algorithm that generates trigger sets
from elements where f is undefined. By our simplify-
ing assumption from Section 2.1, the model will clas-
sify the images in the trigger set to random labels. Fur-
thermore, assume that the model is ε-accurate (which it
also is on the trigger set). Then, one can model a dis-
honest party to randomly get (1− ε)|T | out of |T | com-
mitted images right using a Binomial distribution. We
want to upper-bound this event to have probability at
most 2−n and use Hoeffding’s inequality to obtain that
|T |> n · ln(2)/( 1|L| + ε− 1).
To implement our scheme, it is necessary that vk be-
comes public before Verify is used. This ensures that
a party does not simply generate a fake key after see-
ing a model. A solution for this is to e.g. publish the
key on a time-stamped bulletin board like a blockchain.
In addition, a statistically hiding commitment scheme
should be used that allows for efficient evaluation in
zero-knowledge (see Appendix A.1). For this one can
e.g. use a scheme based on a cryptographic hash func-
tion such as the one described in [39].
5 A Direct Construction of Watermarking
This section describes a scheme for watermarking a neu-
ral network model for image classification, and experi-
ments analyzing it with respect to the definitions in Sec-
tion 3. We demonstrate that it is hard to reduce the persis-
tence of watermarks that are generated with our method.
For all the technical details regarding the implementation
and hyper-parameters, we refer the reader to Section 5.7.
5.1 The Construction
Similar to Section 4, we use a set of images as the mark-
ing key or trigger set of our construction4. To embed
the watermark, we optimize the models using both train-
ing set and trigger set. We investigate two approaches:
the first approach starts from a pre-trained model, i.e., a
model that was trained without a trigger set, and contin-
ues training the model together with a chosen trigger set.
This approach is denoted as PRETRAINED. The second
approach trains the model from scratch along with the
trigger set. This approach is denoted as FROMSCRATCH.
This latter approach is related to Data Poisoning tech-
niques.
During training, for each batch, denote as bt the batch
at iteration t, we sample k trigger set images and ap-
pend them to bt . We follow this procedure for both ap-
proaches. We tested different numbers of k (i.e., 2, 4,
and 8), and setting k = 2 reach the best results. We
hypothesize that this is due to the Batch-Normalization
layer [23]. The Batch-Normalization layer has two
modes of operations. During training, it keeps a running
estimate of the computed mean and variance. During an
evaluation, the running mean and variance are used for
normalization. Hence, adding more images to each batch
puts more focus on the trigger set images and makes con-
vergence slower.
In all models we optimize the Negative Log Likeli-
hood loss function on both training set and trigger set.
4As the set of images will serve a similar purpose as the trigger set
from backdoors in Section 2, we denote the marking key as trigger set
throughout this section.
Notice, we assume the creator of the model will be the
one who embeds the watermark, hence has access to the
training set, test set, and trigger set.
In the following subsections, we demonstrate the ef-
ficiency of our method regarding non-trivial ownership
and unremovability and furthermore show that it is
functionality-preserving, following the ideas outlined in
Section 3. For that we use three different image classi-
fication datasets: CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100 and ImageNet
[28, 37]. We chose those datasets to demonstrate that our
method can be applied to models with a different number
of classes and also for large-scale datasets.
5.2 Non-Trivial Ownership
In the non-trivial ownership setting, an adversary will
not be able to claim ownership of the model even if he
knows the watermarking algorithm. To fulfill this re-
quirement we randomly sample the examples for the trig-
ger set. We sampled a set of 100 abstract images, and for
each image, we randomly selected a target class.
This sampling-based approach ensures that the exam-
ples from the trigger set are uncorrelated to each other.
Therefore revealing a subset from the trigger set will
not reveal any additional information about the other
examples in the set, as is required for public verifia-
bility. Moreover, since both examples and labels are
chosen randomly, following this method makes back-
propagation based attacks extremely hard. Figure 5
shows an example from the trigger set.
Figure 5: An example image from the trigger set. The
label that was assigned to this image was “automobile”.
5.3 Functionality-Preserving
For the functionality-preserving property we require that
a model with a watermark should be as accurate as a
model without a watermark. In general, each task defines
its own measure of performance [2, 25, 4, 3]. However,
since in the current work we are focused on image clas-
sification tasks, we measure the accuracy of the model
using the 0-1 loss.
Table 1 summarizes the test set and trigger-set classifi-
cation accuracy on CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100, for three
different models; (i) a model with no watermark (NO-
WM); (ii) a model that was trained with the trigger set
from scratch (FROMSCRATCH); and (iii) a pre-trained
model that was trained with the trigger set after conver-
gence on the original training data set (PRETRAINED).
Model Test-set acc. Trigger-set
acc.
CIFAR-10
NO-WM 93.42 7.0
FROMSCRATCH 93.81 100.0
PRETRAINED 93.65 100.0
CIFAR-100
NO-WM 74.01 1.0
FROMSCRATCH 73.67 100.0
PRETRAINED 73.62 100.0
Table 1: Classification accuracy for CIFAR-10 and
CIFAR-100 datasets on the test set and trigger set.
It can be seen that all models have roughly the same
test set accuracy and that in both FROMSCRATCH and
PRETRAINED the trigger-set accuracy is 100%. Since
the trigger-set labels were chosen randomly, the NO-
WM models’ accuracy depends on the number of
classes. For example, the accuracy on CIFAR-10 is 7.0%
while on CIFAR-100 is only 1.0%.
5.4 Unremovability
In order to satisfy the unremovability property, we first
need to define the types of unremovability functions we
are going to explore. Recall that our goal in the unremov-
ability experiments is to investigate the robustness of the
watermarked models against changes that aim to remove
the watermark while keeping the same functionality of
the model. Otherwise, one can set all weights to zero
and completely remove the watermark but also destroy
the model.
Thus, we are focused on fine-tuning experiments. In
other words, we wish to keep or improve the performance
of the model on the test set by carefully training it. Fine-
tuning seems to be the most probable type of attack since
it is frequently used and requires less computational re-
sources and training data [38, 43, 35]. Since in our set-
tings we would like to explore the robustness of the wa-
termark against strong attackers, we assumed that the ad-
versary can fine-tune the models using the same amount
of training instances and epochs as in training the model.
An important question one can ask is: when is it still
my model? or other words how much can I change the
model and still claim ownership? This question is highly
relevant in the case of watermarking. In the current work
we handle this issue by measuring the performance of
the model on the test set and trigger set, meaning that
the original creator of the model can claim ownership of
the model if the model is still ε-accurate on the original
test set while also ε-accurate on the trigger set. We leave
the exploration of different methods and of a theoretical
definition of this question for future work.
Fine-Tuning. We define four different variations of
fine-tuning procedures:
• Fine-Tune Last Layer (FTLL): Update the parame-
ters of the last layer only. In this setting we freeze
the parameters in all the layers except in the output
layer. One can think of this setting as if the model
outputs a new representation of the input features
and we fine-tune only the output layer.
• Fine-Tune All Layers (FTAL): Update all the layers
of the model.
• Re-Train Last Layers (RTLL): Initialize the param-
eters of the output layer with random weights and
only update them. In this setting, we freeze the pa-
rameters in all the layers except for the output layer.
The motivation behind this approach is to investi-
gate the robustness of the watermarkedmodel under
noisy conditions. This can alternatively be seen as
changing the model to classify for a different set of
output labels.
• Re-Train All Layers (RTAL): Initialize the param-
eters of the output layer with random weights and
update the parameters in all the layers of the net-
work.
Figure 6 presents the results for both the PRE-
TRAINED and FROMSCRATCH models over the test set
and trigger set, after applying these four different fine-
tuning techniques.
The results suggest that while both models reach al-
most the same accuracy on the test set, the FROM-
SCRATCH models are superior or equal to the PRE-
TRAINED models overall fine-tuning methods. FROM-
SCRATCH reaches roughly the same accuracy on the trig-
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Figure 6: Classification accuracy on the test set and
trigger set for CIFAR-10 (top) and CIFAR-100 (bot-
tom) using different fine-tuning techniques. For exam-
ple, in the bottom right bars we can see that the PRE-
TRAINED model (green) suffers a dramatic decrease in
the results comparing the baseline (bottom left) using the
RTAL technique.
ger set when each of the four types of fine-tuning ap-
proaches is applied.
Notice that this observation holds for both the CIFAR-
10 and CIFAR-100 datasets, where for CIFAR-100 it ap-
pears to be easier to remove the trigger set using the PRE-
TRAINED models. Concerning the above-mentioned re-
sults, we now investigate what will happen if an adver-
sary wants to embed a watermark in a model which has
already been watermarked. This can be seen as a black-
box attack on the already existing watermark. Accord-
ing to the fine-tuning experiments, removing this new
trigger set using the above fine-tuning approaches will
not hurt the original trigger set and will dramatically de-
crease the results on the new trigger set. In the next para-
graph, we explore and analyze this setting. Due to the
fact that FROMSCRATCH models are more robust than
PRETRAINED, for the rest of the paper, we report the
results for those models only.
5.5 Ownership Piracy
As we mentioned in Section 3, in this set of experiments
we explore the scenario where an adversary wishes to
claim ownership of a model which has already been wa-
termarked.
For that purpose, we collected a new trigger set of dif-
ferent 100 images, denoted as TS-NEW, and embedded
it to the FROMSCRATCH model (this new set will be used
by the adversary to claim ownership of the model). No-
tice that the FROMSCRATCH models were trained using
a different trigger set, denoted as TS-ORIG. Then, we
fine-tuned the models using RTLL and RTAL methods.
In order to have a fair comparison between the robust-
ness of the trigger sets after fine-tuning, we use the same
amount of epochs to embed the new trigger set as we
used for the original one.
Figure 7 summarizes the results on the test set, TS-
NEW and TS-ORIG. We report results for both the FTAL
and RTAL methods together with the baseline results of
no fine tuning at all (we did not report here the results
of FTLL and RTLL since those can be considered as the
easy cases in our setting). The red bars refer to the model
with no fine tuning, the yellow bars refer to the FTAL
method and the blue bars refer to RTAL.
The results suggest that the original trigger set, TS-
ORIG, is still embedded in the model (as is demonstrated
in the right columns) and that the accuracy of classify-
ing it even improves after fine-tuning. This may im-
ply that the model embeds the trigger set in a way that
is close to the training data distribution. However, in
the new trigger set, TS-NEW, we see a significant drop
in the accuracy. Notice, we can consider embedding
TS-NEW as embedding a watermark using the PRE-
TRAINED approach. Hence, this accuracy drop of TS-
NEW is not surprising and goes in hand with the results
we observed in Figure 6.
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Figure 7: Classification accuracy on CIFAR-10 (top) and
CIFAR-100 (bottom) datasets after embedding two trig-
ger sets, TS-ORIG and TS-NEW. We present results for
no tuning (red), FTAL (yellow) and TRAL (blue).
Transfer Learning. In transfer learning we would like
to use knowledge gained while solving one problem and
apply it to a different problem. For example, we use a
trained model on one dataset (source dataset) and fine-
tune it on a new dataset (target dataset). For that pur-
pose, we fine-tuned the FROMSCRATCH model (which
was trained on either CIFAR-10 or CIFAR-100), for an-
other 20 epochs using the labeled part of the STL-10
dataset [12].
Recall that our watermarking scheme is based on the
outputs of the model. As a result, when fine-tuning a
model on a different dataset it is very likely that we
change the number of classes, and then our method will
probably break. Therefore, in order to still be able to
verify the watermark we save the original output layer,
so that on verification time we use the model’s original
output layer instead of the new one.
Following this approach makes both FTLL and RTLL
useless due to the fact that these methods update the
parameters of the output layer only. Regarding FTAL,
this approach makes sense in specific settings where the
classes of the source dataset are related to the target
dataset. This property holds for CIFAR-10 but not for
CIFAR-100. Therefore we report the results only for
RTAL method.
Table 2 summarizes the classification accuracy on the
test set of STL-10 and the trigger set after transferring
from CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100.
Test set acc. Trigger set acc.
CIFAR10→ STL10 81.87 72.0
CIFAR100→ STL10 77.3 62.0
Table 2: Classification accuracy on STL-10 dataset and
the trigger set, after transferring from either CIFAR-10
or CIFAR-100 models.
Although the trigger set accuracy is smaller after trans-
ferring the model to a different dataset, results suggest
that the trigger set still has a lot of presence in the net-
work even after fine-tuning on a new dataset.
5.6 ImageNet - Large Scale Visual Recog-
nition Dataset
For the last set of experiments, we would like to ex-
plore the robustness of our watermarking method on a
large scale dataset. For that purpose, we use ImageNet
dataset [37] which contains about 1.3 million training
images with over 1000 categories.
Table 3 summarizes the results for the functionality-
preserving tests. We can see from Table 3 that both mod-
els, with and without watermark, achieve roughly the
same accuracy in terms of Prec@1 and Prec@5, while
the model without the watermark attains 0% on the trig-
ger set and the watermarked model attain 100% on the
same set.
Prec@1 Prec@5
Test Set
NO-WM 66.64 87.11
FROMSCRATCH 66.51 87.21
Trigger Set
NO-WM 0.0 0.0
FROMSCRATCH 100.0 100.0
Table 3: ImageNet results, Prec@1 and Prec@5, for a
ResNet18 model with and without a watermark.
Notice that the results we report for ResNet18 on Im-
ageNet are slightly below what is reported in the litera-
ture. The reason beyond that is due to training for fewer
epochs (training a model on ImageNet is computation-
ally expensive, so we train our models for fewer epochs
than what is reported).
In Table 4 we report the results of transfer learning
from ImageNet to ImageNet, those can be considered as
FTAL, and from ImageNet to CIFAR-10, can be consid-
ered as RTAL or transfer learning.
Prec@1 Prec@5
Test Set
ImageNet→ ImageNet 66.62 87.22
ImageNet→ CIFAR-10 90.53 99.77
Trigger Set
ImageNet→ ImageNet 100.0 100.0
ImageNet→ CIFAR-10 24.0 52.0
Table 4: ImageNet results, Prec@1 and Prec@5, for fine
tuning using ImageNet and CIFAR-10 datasets.
Notice that after fine tuning on ImageNet, trigger set
results are still very high, meaning that the trigger set
has a very strong presence in the model also after fine-
tuning. When transferring to CIFAR-10, we see a drop in
the Prec@1 and Prec@5. However, considering the fact
that ImageNet contains 1000 target classes, these results
are still significant.
5.7 Technical Details
We implemented all models using the PyTorch pack-
age [33]. In all the experiments we used a ResNet-18
model, which is a convolutional based neural network
model with 18 layers [20, 21]. We optimized each of the
models using Stochastic Gradient Descent (SGD), using
a learning rate of 0.1. For CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100 we
trained the models for 60 epochs while halving the learn-
ing rate by ten every 20 epochs. For ImageNet we trained
the models for 30 epochs while halving the learning rate
by ten every ten epochs. The batch size was set to 100 for
the CIFAR10 and CIFAR100, and to 256 for ImageNet.
For the fine-tuning tasks, we used the last learning rate
that was used during training.
6 Conclusion and Future Work
In this work we proposed a practical analysis of the abil-
ity to watermark a neural network using random training
instances and random labels. We presented possible at-
tacks that are both black-box and grey-box in the model,
and showed how robust our watermarking approach is to
them. At the same time, we outlined a theoretical con-
nection to the previous work on backdooring such mod-
els.
For future work we would like to define a theoreti-
cal boundary for how much change must a party apply
to a model before he can claim ownership of the model.
We also leave as an open problem the construction of a
practically efficient zero-knowledge proof for our pub-
licly verifiable watermarking construction.
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A Supplementary Material
In this appendixwe further discuss how to achieve public
verifiability for a variant of our watermarking scheme.
Let us first introduce the following additional notation:
for a vector e∈ {0,1}ℓ, let e|0 = {i∈ [ℓ] | e[i] = 0} be the
set of all indices where e is 0 and define e|1 accordingly.
Given a verification key vk = {c
(i)
t ,c
(i)
L }i∈[ℓ] containing ℓ
elements and a vector e ∈ {0,1}ℓ, we write the selection
of elements from vk according to e as
vk|e0 = {c
(i)
t ,c
(i)
L }i∈e|0 and vk|
e
1 = {c
(i)
t ,c
(i)
L }i∈e|1 .
For a marking key mk = (b,{r
(i)
t ,r
(i)
L }i∈[ℓ]) with ℓ ele-
ments and b= {T (i),T
(i)
L }i∈[ℓ] we then define
mk|e0 = (b|
e
0,{r
(i)
t ,r
(i)
L }i∈e|0) with b|
e
0 = {T
(i),T
(i)
L }i∈e|0
(and mk|e1 accordingly). We assume the existence of a
cryptographic hash function H : {0,1}p(n)→{0,1}n.
A.1 From Private to Public Verifiability
To achieve public verifiability, we will make use of
a cryptographic tool called a zero-knowledge argument
[15], which is a technique that allows a prover P to con-
vince a verifier V that a certain public statement is true,
without giving away any further information. This idea
is similar to the idea of unlimited public verification as
outlined in Section 4.1.
Zero-Knowledge Arguments. Let TM be an abbrevi-
ation for TuringMachines. An iTM is defined to be an in-
teractive TM, i.e. a Turing Machine with a special com-
munication tape. Let LR⊆{0,1}
∗ be an NP language and
R be its related NP-relation, i.e. (x,w) ∈ R iff x ∈ LR and
the TM used to define LR outputs 1 on input of the state-
ment x and the witness w. We write Rx = {w | (x,w)∈ R}
for the set of witnesses for a fixed x. Moreover, let P ,V
be a pair of PPT iTMs. For (x,w) ∈ R, P will obtain
w as input while V obtains an auxiliary random string
z ∈ {0,1}∗. In addition, x will be input to both TMs. De-
note with VP(a)(b) the output of the iTM V with input
b when communicating with an instance of P that has
input a.
(P ,V) is called an interactive proof system for the lan-
guage L if the following two conditions hold:
Completeness: For every x ∈ LR there exists a string w
such that for every z: Pr[VP(x,w)(x,z) = 1] is negli-
gibly close to 1.
Soundness: For every x 6∈ LR, every PPT iTM P
∗ and
every string w,z: Pr[VP
∗(x,w)(x,z) = 1] is negligible.
An interactive proof system is called computational
zero-knowledge if for every PPT Vˆ there exists a PPT
simulator S such that for any x ∈ LR
{VˆP(x,w)(x,z)}w∈Rx,z∈{0,1}∗ ≈c {S(x,z)}z∈{0,1}∗ ,
meaning that all information which can be learned from
observing a protocol transcript can also be obtained from
running a polynomial-time simulator S which has no
knowledge of the witness w.
A.1.1 Outlining the Idea
An intuitive approach to build PVerify is to convert the
algorithm Verify(mk,vk,M) from Section 4 into an NP
relation R and use a zero-knowledge argument system.
Unfortunately, this must fail due to Step 1 of Verify:
there, one tests if the item b contained in mk actually is
a backdoor as defined above. Therefore, we would need
access to the ground-truth function f in the interactive ar-
gument system. This first of all needs human assistance,
but is moreover only possible by revealing the backdoor
elements.
We will now give a different version of the scheme
from Section 4 which embeds an additional proof into vk.
This proof shows that, with overwhelming probability,
most of the elements in the verification key indeed form
a backdoor. Based on this, we will then design a dif-
ferent verification procedure, based on a zero-knowledge
argument system.
A.1.2 A Convincing Argument that most Commit-
ted Values are Wrongly Classified
Verifying that most of the elements of the trigger set
are labeled wrongly is possible, if one accepts5 to re-
lease a portion of this set. To solve the proof-of-
misclassification problem, we use the so-called cut-and-
choose technique: in cut-and-choose, the verifier V will
ask the proverP to open a subset of the committed inputs
and labels from the verification key. Here, V is allowed
to choose the subset that will be opened to him. Intu-
itively, if P committed to a large number elements that
are correctly labeled (according to O f ), then at least one
of them will show up in the values opened by P with
overwhelming probability over the choice that V makes.
Hence, most of the remaining commitments which were
not opened must form a correct backdoor.
5This is fine if T , as in our experiments, only consists of random
images.
To use cut-and-choose, the backdoor size must con-
tain ℓ > n elements, where our analysis will use ℓ = 4n
(other values of ℓ are also possible). Then, consider the
following protocol between P and V :
CnC(ℓ) :
1. P runs (mk,vk)← KeyGen(ℓ) to obtain a backdoor
of size ℓ and sends vk to V . We again define mk =
(b,{r
(i)
t ,r
(i)
L }i∈[ℓ]), vk = {c
(i)
t ,c
(i)
L }i∈[ℓ]
2. V chooses e ← {0,1}ℓ uniformly at random and
sends it to P .
3. P sends mk|e1 to V .
4. V checks that for i ∈ e|1 that
(a) Open(c
(i)
t , t
(i),r
(i)
t ) = 1;
(b) Open(c
(i)
L ,T
(i)
L ,r
(i)
L ) = 1; and
(c) T
(i)
L 6= f (t
(i)).
Assume that P chose exactly one element of the back-
door in vk wrongly, then this will be revealed by CnC to
an honest V with probability 1/2 (where P must open
vk|e1 to the values he put into c
(i)
t ,c
(i)
L during KeyGen due
to the binding-property of the commitment). In general,
one can show that a cheating P can put at most n non-
backdooring inputs into vk|e0 except with probability neg-
ligible in n. Therefore, if the above check passes for
ℓ = 4n at then least 1/2 of the values for vk|e0 must have
the wrong committed label as in a valid backdoor with
overwhelming probability.
The above argument can be made non-interactive
and thus publicly verifiable using the Fiat-Shamir
transform[13]: in the protocol CnC, P can generate the
bit string e itself by hashing vk using a cryptographic
hash function H. Then e will be distributed as if it was
chosen by an honest verifier, while it is sufficiently ran-
dom by the guarantees of the hash function to allow
the same analysis for cut-and-choose. Any V can re-
compute the value e if it is generated from the commit-
ments (while this also means that the challenge e is gen-
erated after the commitments were computed), and we
can turn the above algorithm CnC into the following non-
interactive key-generation algorithm PKeyGen.
PKeyGen(ℓ) :
1. Run (mk,vk)← KeyGen(ℓ).
2. Compute e←H(vk).
3. Set mkp ← (mk,e), vkp ← (vk,mk|
e
1) and return
(mkp,vkp).
A.1.3 Constructing the Public Verification Algo-
rithm
In the modified scheme, the Mark algorithm will only
use the private subsetmk|e0 ofmkp but will otherwise re-
main unchanged. The public verification algorithm for
a model M then follows the following structure: (i) V
recomputes the challenge e; (ii) V checks vkp to assure
that all of vk|e1 will form a valid backdoor ; and (iii) P ,V
run Classify onmk|e0 using the interactive zero-knowl-
edge argument system, and further test if the watermark-
ing conditions onM,mk|e0,vk|
e
0 hold.
For an arbitrary model M, one can rewrite the steps
2 and 3 of Verify (using M,Open,Classify) into a
binary circuit C that outputs 1 iff the prover inputs the
correct mk|e0 which opens vk|
e
0 and if enough of these
openings satisfy Classify. Both P ,V can generate
this circuit C as its construction does not involve private
information. For the interactive zero-knowledge argu-
ment, we let the relation R be defined by boolean cir-
cuits that output 1 where x =C,w =mk|e0 in the follow-
ing protocol PVerify, which will obtain the model M
as well as mkp = (mk,e) and vkp = (vk,mk|
e
1) where
vk = {c
(i)
t ,c
(i)
L }i∈[ℓ], mk = (b,{r
(i)
t ,r
(i)
L }i∈[ℓ]) and b =
{T (i),T
(i)
L }i∈[ℓ] as input.
1. V computes e′ ← H(vk). If mk|e1 in vkp does not
match e′ then abort, else continue assuming e= e′.
2. V checks that for all i ∈ e|1:
(a) Open(c
(i)
t , t
(i),r
(i)
t ) = 1
(b) Open(c
(i)
L ,T
(i)
L ,r
(i)
L ) = 1
(c) T
(i)
L 6= f (t
(i))
If one of the checks fails, then V aborts.
3. P ,V compute a circuit C with input mk|e0 that out-
puts 1 iff for all i ∈ e|0:
(a) Open(c
(i)
t , t
(i),r
(i)
t ) = 1
(b) Open(c
(i)
L ,T
(i)
L ,r
(i)
L ) = 1.
Moreover, it tests that Classify(t(i),M) = T
(i)
L for
all but ε|e|0| elements.
4. P ,V run a zero-knowledge argument for the given
relation R using C as the statement, where the wit-
ness mk|e0 is the secret input of P . V accepts iff the
argument succeeds.
Assume the protocol PVerify succeeds. Then in the
interactive argument, M classifies at least (1− ε)|e|0| ≈
(1− ε)2n values of the backdoor b to the committed
value. For ≈ n of the commitments, we can assume that
the committed label does not coincide with the ground-
truth function f due to the guarantees of Step 1. It is easy
to see that this translates into a 2ε-guarantee for the cor-
rect backdoor. By choosing a larger number ℓ for the size
of the backdoor, one can achieve values that are arbitrar-
ily close to ε in the above protocol.
